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OIL AND GAS
by
Bob F. Young*

S INCE

the last Survey Texas courts have decided two cases which are of
major significance to the oil and gas industry due to their economic impact
and the legal principles involved! Each of these cases will be reviewed under
the appropriate topic.' While these cases deserve special attention, decisions
concerning pooling and unitization, disposition of the proceeds from production, taxation, and procedure will also be discussed.
I. SURFACE USE

Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker' was reviewed in last year's Survey. Since that
time, the Supreme Court of Texas has withdrawn its opinion, and, in a five-tofour decision, reversed the holding of the court of civil appeals It is one of
those rare decisions in which the supreme court found no evidence to support
the jury's findings of fact. But the decision is not based solely on the evidence
question, and an important legal relationship between a surface owner and his
mineral lessee was established.
A brief statement of the facts will be sufficient. The plaintiff, Whitaker,
was the owner of the surface estate, the minerals having been reserved to his
grantor. Sun Oil Company's oil and gas lease predated Whitaker's purchase
and provided: "Lessee shall have free use of . . .water from said land except
water from Lessor's wells for all operations .... .' Sun undertook a secondary
recovery operation by waterflood, which required the use of 4,200,000 barrels
of Ogallala Formation fresh water from a well located on Whitaker's land.
It was estimated that the waterflood would provide an additional recovery from
the reservoir of $3,200,000 worth of oil. It was also estimated that the use of
4,200,000 barrels of fresh water in the waterflood would shorten the life of
Whitaker's water supply by eight years.
The Ogallala Formation is a vast, but depleting, underground water reservoir. The agricultural economy of the area has flourished from the use of this
water for irrigation, and Whitaker relied on fresh water wells to irrigate his
land. The formation is like a bowl extending from eastern New Mexico across
the high plains of Texas." It is not like an underground stream which is occasionally tapped, but more like a closed bowl into which many straws are
inserted to obtain fresh water. Although Sun could have purchased its water
0 B.B.A., University of Georgia; LL.B., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Dallas,
Texas.
'Sun Oil Co. v. Whitaker, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Southland
Royalty Co., 478 S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
'See text accompanying notes 3-14, 19-24 infra.
'15 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 60 (1971), rev'd on rehearing, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex. 1972).
4
McCoy, Oil and Gas, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 59, 61-63 (1972).
3457 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1970), rev'd, 483 S.W.2d 808 (Tex.
1972).
0483 S.W.2d at 810.
'Texas Water Comm'n, The Development of the Science of Hydrology, Circular No.
63-03 (prepared for presentation at a public hearing held by the Texas Water Pollution
Control Board on Sept. 25, 1963, at Austin, Texas).
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from the owner of an adjoining tract for $42,000, the water well on the
adjoining tract would merely have represented another straw in the bowl.
The court's reasoning in its final decision is substantially the same as that
in the decision which it withdrew, except for the finding of no evidence to
support the jury's findings of fact. The court did not rely on the express grant
of the right to use water which was contained in the lease, but instead found
that Sun had an implied right to free use of so much of the subsurface water
as might be reasonably necessary to produce the oil from its wells. The court
then held that a waterflood project is a reasonable operation under an oil and
gas lease, and that Sun's waterflood was a reasonable operation, since the
parties had stipulated that "the use of Ogallala water was reasonably necessary
to effectuate the purposes of the lease."8 In response to special issues, however,
the jury had found that it was not reasonably necessary for Sun to use fresh
water from Whitaker's land for the waterflood project. Departing from its
prior decision, the court found that there was no evidence to support the jury's
finding and, therefore, Whitaker was permanently enjoined from interfering
with Sun's use of up to 100,000 gallons of fresh water per day from his land.
The court indicated that the use of fresh water from Whitaker's land was
reasonably necessary because efforts to use available salt water had failed and
no other water was available on the leased tract. The court stated: "To hold
that Sun can be required to purchase water from other sources or owners of
other tracts in the area, would be in derogation of the dominant estate."9 The
court added that its holding in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones was not applicable to
this situation. In Getty the court had required the oil and gas lessee to locate
its pumps below the height of the surface owner's irrigation system so that
production of the minerals would not interfere with the use of the surface as
an irrigated farm. However, in Whitaker the court expressly limited its holding
in Getty "to situations in which there are reasonable alternative methods that
may be employed by the lessee on the leased premises to accomplish the purposes of this lease."11
In the dissenting opinion," Justice Daniel maintained that Sun did not have
either an express or implied right to deplete the fresh water in its secondary
recovery operations. The majority had not found it necessary to consider the
effect of the free water clause, since it had found an implied right to use water
for the waterflood. However, Justice Daniel found that the terms of the lease
and the circumstances existing at the time it was executed established that the
parties did not intend the grant of the right to use water to extend to the extensive use of fresh water for secondary recovery operations." Likewise, the
implied right to use water for ordinary drilling and production did not include
1483
9

S.W.2d at 811 (emphasis by the court).
d. at 812.
10470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971), reviewed in McCoy, supra note 4, at 59-61.
11483 S.W.2d at 812 (emphasis by the court).
12Id.

" Justice Daniel cited the following evidence to support his conclusion. (1) the absence of any specific provision in the lease relating to secondary recovery by waterflood;
(2) the specific provision for the protection of the lessor's wells and growing crops; and
(3) the fact that watetflooding was not practiced in the west Texas area when the lease
was signed in 1946. Id. at 815.
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the right to use the fresh water in secondary recovery operations "in a manner
which substantially destroys and diminishes the surface estate."'4 Justice Daniel
argued that the majority had re-established the absolute dominance of the mineral estate with its holding that the Getty test of reasonable necessity, based on
the uses being made by the surface owner and the alternatives available, was
not applicable because the only alternative water source was not on the leased
premises. Thus, he considered the majority decision to be a departure from
the trend toward accommodation of the interests of the mineral lessee and the
surface owner.
Two other cases involving conflicts between a landowner and the oil and
gas operator over the use of the surface were decided during the year. In
Kennedy v. Brandenburg" the landowner, Brandenburg, brought suit for damages caused by brine water leaking from the defendant's pipeline. Brandenburg alleged that the defendant was negligent in allowing the line to break
and in failing to keep a proper lookout for breaks. The trial court refused to
submit special issues based on the theory of negligence to the jury. Instead,
the trial court submitted issues inquiring only whether the defendant had
allowed the brine to enter the plaintiff's irrigation canal and whether that was
the proximate cause of any of the damages sustained by the plaintiff. The jury
returned a verdict for the plaintiff with money damages. The defendant appealed and argued that the trial court had erred in submitting special issues
to the jury based on the theory of strict liability rather than negligence. The
court of appeals reversed and remanded the case on the basis of the holdings
1
in Turner v.Big Lake Oil Co." and Humble Pipeline Co. v. Anderson,"
which

established that strict liability did not apply to the operation of pipelines.
Therefore, the court held that in order for the plaintiff to recover, he must
allege and prove negligence of the defendant and that this negligence was a
proximate cause of his damages.
In the second case " the court of civil appeals upheld the granting of a
temporary injunction against the landowners in favor of the oil company.
Texas Pacific Oil Company was the operator under a unit agreement ratified
by the landowners. The landowners claimed that Texas Pacific was not entitled to a temporary injunction because the route which Texas Pacific sought
to use as a roadway was not the only road available, and it interfered with the
landowners' use of the surface. The appeals court held that the trial court
had not abused its discretion in granting the injunction, since the main purpose of a temporary injunction is to maintain the status quo and not to determine the substance of the controversy. The facts of the case did not reveal
whether the roadway was already in use; thus, it must be assumed that the
status quo which the trial court sought to maintain was the existing use of
the roadway by the oil company. Such a case illustrates that the status quo is
often an elusive, ill-defined concept.
14 Id. at 812.
5470 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971).
"1128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W.2d 221 (1936).
17339 S.W.2d 259 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1960), error ref. n.r.e.
18Cunningham v.Texas Pac. Oil Co., 474 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971).
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II. CONSTRUCTION OF INSTRUMENTS

In Gulf Oil Corp.. v. Southland Royalty Co. " W. N. Waddell had executed

an oil and gas lease to Gulf Oil Corporation on July 14, 1925, for a term not
to exceed fifty years. Southland Royalty Company succeeded to a portion of the
mineral interest subject to the oil and gas lease. Gulf and others drilled and
developed the premises for oil and gas, but the tract would not be depleted by
the end of the term of the lease on July 14, 1975. In addition to the habendum clause, however, the lease contained a force majeure clause which stated
that when "drilling or other operations" are delayed or interrupted by certain
enumerated causes, including governmental action, "the time of such delay or
interruption shall not be counted against the Lessee--anything in this lease
to the contrary notwithstanding."'"
Gulf introduced evidence to prove that during the period January 1, 1936,
through June 30, 1967, the Railroad Commission of Texas had denied them
the right to produce for a period in excess of 4,661 days. As a result of such
regulation, the plaintiffs contended that the term of the lease should be extended for an equivalent period of time in order to allow them to recover
this production. The trial court withdrew the case from the jury and construed the lease against the plaintiffs. The court of civil appeals affirmed the
trial court's judgment.
No contention was made that the instrument was ambiguous, and the court
of appeals, therefore, applied the established rule that the intention of the
parties must be determined from the instrument alone, taking into consideration the surrounding facts and circumstances as an aid to construction and interpretation. The court cited numerous general authorities for the proposition
that the habendum clause in an oil and gas lease is the dominant clause and is
not to be extended by other provisions which are indirect, ambiguous, and
negative." In determining whether the force majeure clause operated to extend
the term of the lease, the court considered other oil and gas leases taken by
Gulf at about the same time. It was noted that in each instance an identical
force majeure clause was included, but that the habendum clause in the other
leases provided for a term of years and as long thereafter as necessary to produce; none contained a specific term clause similar to the one contained in this
lease. The court considered this to be clear and unmistakeable evidence that
the parties contemplated a definite and fixed term lease. The court then cited
the constitutional amendment of 1917," legislation of 1919,"3 and Railroad
Commission circulars of 1919 and 1923, all of which concerned the regulation of the oil and gas industry, including regulation of production. The court
concluded that the parties contracted with full knowledge of the potential
1"478

S.W.2d 583 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972), error granted.
'OId.at 585-86.
"1See, e.g., 2 W. SUMMERS, THE LAw OF OIL AND GAS 5§ 303.1, 302 (perm. ed.
1938); Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in
Texas, 8 TEXAS L. REv. 483, 516 (1930).
2
' TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 59(a).
'TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6014 (1962) (originally enacted as ch. 155, [1919)
Tex. Laws 285).
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regulation and that the force majeure clause was not intended to extend the
lease beyond the fifty-year term provided in the habendum clause.
Dissenting," Justice Preslar agreed with the basic rules of construction
stated by the majority. He contended, however, that the force majeure clause
was intended by the parties to operate to extend the term of the lease. He
relied on the fact that the habendum clause was paragraph 2 under section 1
of the lease; the force majeure clause was section 7; and the development
clauses, with their own forfeiture terms, were among the six paragraphs of
section 1. Thus, he concluded that section 7 was of equal dignity with section
2 because it was to apply "anything in this lease to the contrary notwithstanding." While the majority had held that the term "operations" in the
force majeure clause referred only to exploration and development, Justice
Preslar maintained that the term included production. He found, from the
same facts and evidence considered by the majority, that the parties were
aware of potential regulation of production and included the force majeure
clause to cover that eventuality.
Shuttle Oil Corp. v. Hamon" is a case construing a conditional assignment
of an oil and gas lease. In 1952 Daube Interests had assigned to Hamon the
mineral lease covering a section of land below the depth of 3,000 feet. The
granting clause of the assignment was not unusual, but the assignment required the drilling of a well upon one of the quarter sections within 120 days
of the date of the assignment. The instrument provided that upon failure to
comply with this requirement, the assignment would terminate. Furthermore,
if a second well were not commenced within six months after the completion
of the first well, the assignment would terminate for all of the sections except
the quarter section upon which the first well was drilled. Similar provisions
applied to the third and fourth wells and the third and fourth sections.
Hamon drilled a well on the first quarter section in 1952 and completed
it as a dry hole. Hamon did not drill any other wells on the section and his
lease for the three remaining quarter sections terminated. In January 1970
the Daube Interests assigned whatever interest they had in the section to the
plaintiff. One month later, Hamon re-entered the old hole and completed
it as a producer.
The plaintiff contended that the assignment to Hamon had terminated by
virtue of an implied limitation that the estate be used for the purpose for
which the assignment was granted. In the alternative, it claimed that Hamon
had abandoned the leasehold because he had done no work on the tract from
November 30, 1952, to February 24, 1970. The court held that Hamon had
superior title to the leasehold covering the quarter section where he had drilled
a well. The court concluded that the terms of the assignment required only
that Hamon drill a well to the prescribed depth within the prescribed time
in order to earn the leasehold interest conveyed in the assignment. Thus, this
decision was based on the simple proposition that Hamon had paid consideration for the assignment of the leasehold on the quarter section in the form
'4478 S.W.2d at 591.
-5477 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
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of the drilling of a well and, therefore, owned the leasehold rights so long as
the oil and gas lease out of which the assignment was made remained in force.
The court also rejected the contention that Hamon had abandoned his
leasehold interest. The court noted that "[tihere is considerable doubt that a
leasehold interest may be lost by abandonment under the present authorities
in this state."'" Accepting the possibility of abandonment, however, the court
held that the evidence demonstrated that there was no intention to abandon
and there had been no actual relinquishment of the enterprise.
Byrd & Poster Drilling, Inc. v. Centennial Royalty Co." was another relatively simple controversy. The defendants in the trial court, Centennial Royalty
Company and M. Ray Hart, each owned an undivided one-half interest in an
oil and gas lease. Both of the defendants made an oral agreement with Byrd

& Foster to drill a well on the lease. A printed form drilling agreement was
completed by Byrd & Foster showing Hart and Centennial as owners of the
lease. Centennial executed the agreement but Hart did not. In the letter of
transmittal returning the signed agreement to Byrd & Foster, Centennial's
agent wrote: "I asked Mr. Ray Hart to have his banker mail you a letter
stating that he will (pay) for one-half of the contract drilling of this well as
soon as he is furnished with a copy of the log. If it is satisfactory with you,
we will be happy to give you a check for payment of our one-half the day
the well is logged." 8 Thereafter, the well was drilled and Centennial paid
one-half of the invoice.
Byrd & Foster filed suit to recover the remaining one-half of the invoice
cost alleging joint and several liability under the terms of the drilling agreement. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Centennial. On
appeal Byrd & Foster claimed that the trial court had erroneously considered
the letter of transmittal as evidence, since the parol evidence rule excluded
all evidence other than the drilling agreement. The judgment of the trial court
was affirmed by the court of civil appeals on the basis of the rule that "where
several instruments, executed contemporaneously or at different times, pertain to the same transaction, they will be read together although they do not
expressly refer to each other."'
III. POOLING AND UNITIZATION

The "annual case" under the Mineral Interest Pooling Act of 19650 is
Broussard v. Texaco, Inc." Suit was brought by the royalty owners under an
oil and gas lease covering the 733.34-acre Broussard tract in Wharton County,

Texas, to enjoin the enforcement of a Railroad Commission order force-pooling
26.692 acres out of their tract and 15.342 adjoining acres out of another tract
to form a 42.034-acre oil unit. Production was already established from other
portions of the 733.34-acre Broussard tract. The trial court denied the plain21 Id. at 705, citing Walker, The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and
Gas Lease in Texas, 7 TEXAs L. REv. 539, 593 (1929).
27477 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. Civ. App.-E Paso 1972).
,1 Id. at 320.
29Id. at 321.
0
TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6008c (Supp. 1972).
81479 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. 1972).
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tiffs the relief that they sought. On direct appeal"2 the supreme court overruled the trial court and granted the injunction.
The supreme court's interpretation of the Act was that it was not intended to
permit the fragmentation
of larger tracts by force pooling. The so-called
3

"muscle in" clause was intended only as a means of protecting the small
tract owner who had not had a fair chance to pool and would suffer drainage
without force pooling. Thus, the clause could not be used to force the combination of unassigned parts of larger tracts which have sufficient acreage for one
or more proration units.
In Yelderman v. McCarthy' the defendant, McCarthy, had succeeded to the
working interest in a lease of a three-fourths mineral interest in a 225.24-acre
tract of land executed by the plaintiff and his wife. On August 21, 1967,
McCarthy filed for record a pooling declaration covering 346.82 acres of land
which included 117.03 acres out of the Yelderman lease. The pooling declaration did not become effective when recorded because McCarthy did not have
the authority to establish a unit embracing less than 640 acres under the terms
of a temporary field order issued by the Railroad Commission. The declaration became effective as recorded only on November 21, 1968, when a permanent field order was issued which permitted a minimum gas unit of 320 acres.
The pooling clause of the Yelderman lease, however, provided that "notwithstanding anything contained herein to the contrary, the lessee in pooling
said lands shall be limited in authority in creating any unit into a pooled area
that will exceed in acreage the minimum size tract on which a well may be
drilled, in order to conform to the spacing pattern prescribed in the field by
regulatory agencies having jurisdiction thereof for any purpose."'3 Since statewide rule 37 of the Texas Railroad Commission" established forty acres as
the minimum unit size at the time the declaration was executed," the attempted 346.82-acre McCarthy-Yelderman gas unit was not authorized by the
Yelderman lease.
McCarthy began mailing royalty checks to the Yeldermans on June 6, 1968,
and continued through July 27, 1970. Most of these checks bore a notation on
the back stating that payment was in full and final settlement for any and
all of the royalty owner's interest in the gas and distillate runs for the respective months from the 346.82-acre gas unit as described in the recorded unit
"1TEx. CONST. art. V, § 3-b; TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1738a (1962); and
TEx. R. Civ. P. 499 (a) provide for direct appeals from decisions determining the validity
or invalidity of an administrative order of the Texas Railroad Commission.
"3TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6008c, S 2(a) (Supp. 1972), provides:
The Commission shall not require the owner of a mineral interest, the productive acreage of which is equal to or in excess of the standard proration
unit for the reservoir, to pool his interest with others, unless requested by the
holder of an adjoining mineral interest, the productive acreage of which is
smaller than such pattern, who has not been provided a reasonable opportunity to pool voluntarily, in which event the Commission shall pool the
smaller tract with adjacent acreage on a fair and reasonable basis and may
authorize a larger allowable for such unit if it exceeds the size of the standard
proration unit for the reservoir.
34474 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1971), error ref. n.r.e.

"Id. at 782.
" Rule 37, Tex. R.R. Comm'n Rules & Regs. § 1, at 22.
'"See

Jones v. Killingsworth, 403 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. 1965).
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designation. In most instances the royalty owners cashed the checks with the
8
added notation "accepted as partial payment only as per lease agreement."'

The court held that the acceptance of these checks constituted ratification of

the pooled unit under established authority.'

The Yeldermans were only

authorized to accept the payment in accordance with its terms, and the conditional acceptance could not alter such terms. Furthermore, the ratification

also operated to make the unit designation effective from the date that it was
recorded.
IV. PROCEEDS FROM PRODUCTION

During the survey period the courts have considered the proper allocation

of the proceeds from production in a variety of situations. In Miller v. Hathaway' it was held that a devise of a mineral interest does not include royalty
payments accrued prior to the testatrix's death and held by the oil company
for her account at the time of her death. The facts of this case were simple.
The oil company held an accumulated royalty credit for the account of Mrs.

McCaughan in the sum of $5,654.14 at the time of her death. Mrs. McCaughan's will devised a life estate in the minerals from which these proceeds
had accrued to her half-brother, M. E. Miller. Miller brought suit to recover

the money held by the oil company, claiming that the testatrix had intended
it to be included in the devise of the mineral interest because she had refused
to sign the division orders for payment of the royalty during her life. The
court found that the cash was part of the testatrix's estate and was not equivalent to the mineral interest devised, since the life estate in the minerals took
effect only upon her death. In other words, the devise was of realty and not of

unpaid proceeds attributable to such realty before the testatrix's death.

4
In Sid Richardson Carbon & Gasoline Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co. the
court was required to determine the contract price to be paid by Richardson
to Phillips for residue gas. The contract provided that the price should be
equal to the price which Phillips received for gas sold to El Paso Natural Gas
Company from one of Phillips' plants. Pursuant to Federal Power Commission
orders, Phillips had made refunds to El Paso with interest. Phillips offered refunds to Richardson on the same basis, but without interest. The court held
that interest was due Richardson to place it in parity with El Paso as required
by the contract. In addition, Richardson was due interest for the period between the date of the Federal Power Commission order and the date of the
judgment.
In another case involving allocation of the proceeds from production,' a
federal district court was required to determine whether the grantors in a deed,
who had reserved a production payment, had shifted the burden of payment
of the occupation tax to the grantee. The consideration for execution of the
38474 S.W.2d at 783.

"See, e.g., Industrial Life Ins. Co. v. Finley, 382 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. 1964); Groves v.
Sawyer, 384 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1964), error ref. n.r.e.
40477 S.W.2d 655 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972).
41456 F.2d 203 (5th 'Cir. 1972).
"3Alexander v. Texaco, Inc., 343 F. Supp. 663 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
4'TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. tit. 122A, arts. 3.01-.11, 4.01-.14 (1969).
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deed was a payment of $225,000 plus $575,000 which was to be paid only
out of the proceeds from 1/32 of the oil produced from the land. The deed
had been executed three years prior to the imposition of the occupation tax,"
and the grantee had not been consistent in deducting the tax from the production payment. Thus, the court had to rely entirely on the language of the deed
to ascertain whether the parties had intended that the grantee should pay the
tax.
The question considered by the court was whether the stated sum of $575,000
represented the net amount to be received by the grantors, or merely measured
the maximum gross amount to be attributed to the reserved 1/32 interest.
The court found that the parties had specifically provided for the allocation
of certain known liabilities. The 1/32 interest was to be measured by the
value of the oil and gas at the well, and, therefore, the grantee would bear
production costs. There was to be no interest on the $575,000 production
payment. However, the parties did not make provision in the lease for unforeseen costs and deductions as was the case in the only Texas decision reviewed by the court in which an intent to shift the burden of a tax was found.'
Based on this fact, the court held that the plaintiffs had not satisfied their
burden of proving that the grantors had intended to shift the tax to the
grantee. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled only
to the value of the 1/32 interest in production reduced by the occupation tax
paid on their interest.
In Bankers Life Insurance Co. v., Scurlock Oil Co.' Bankers had filed suit
against Scurlock for the value of the oil produced from certain leases on which
it held a mortgage. Jordan operated three tank batteries in which he collected
oil for sale to Scurlock. Two of the batteries, the Kangerga tanks, were not
connected to any leases by pipe, but oil was trucked to these tanks from wells
on various leases, some of which were mortgaged to Bankers by Jordan. The
third tank battery, Still tanks, was connected to wells on the A. L. Still lease
which was also mortgaged to Bankers by Jordan. Scurlock purchased oil from
Jordan under the terms of two separate division orders, one covering the Still
tanks which provided for payment to Bankers, and one covering the Kangerga
tanks which provided for payment to Jordan, who was required to make a
proper accounting to Bankers. Jordan transferred, by undisclosed and fraudulent means, oil from the Still lease to the Kangerga tanks and sold it to
Scurlock. Scurlock then paid Jordan directly. Bankers claimed that Scurlock
was required to pay Bankers for all of the oil produced from the Still lease.
Scurlock argued that it was only required to pay Bankers for oil actually received under the division order covering the Still tanks. The court held that
the language of the division order applicable to the Still tanks did not require
Scurlock to pay Bankers for either the oil produced from the Still lease or for
the oil produced and delivered to Scurlock from the Still lease, "but only for
the oil Scurlock receives from the Still lease under that Division Order." The
"Ch. 1, [1959) Tex. Laws 187, as amended, ch. 441, § 1, [1963] Tex. Laws 1136.
" Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Terrell, 183 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1944).
4447 F.2d 997 (5th Cir. 1971).
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court relied on several Texas cases on agency ' in holding that Jordan was
Bankers' agent and that Bankers should suffer for the dishonest acts of its
agent, rather than the innocent third party. Thus, Scurlock was not liable for
conversion of Bankers' oil based on the acts of Jordan.
V. TAXATION
The Texas Supreme Court held in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. CalvertO
that the State of Texas has the power to collect oil and gas production taxes
from an operator producing pursuant to a lease from the United States covering federal lands. Humble paid the state occupation tax" and regulation
pipeline tax' under protest and then brought suit to recover the taxes, relying
on the exemption of the national government from state taxation. The trial
court held that the United States had abandoned its jurisdiction over the mineral estate when it granted an oil and gas lease to Humble. The court of
appealse 1 held that the United States had not abandoned the mineral estate,
but that Congress had consented to the state taxation in the Buck Act."
The supreme court held that although an oil and gas lease under Texas law
conveys a determinable fee estate, the effect of the execution by the United
States of an oil and gas lease must be determined under federal law. Thus,
the execution of the oil and gas lease did not constitute abandonment of the
mineral interest. However, the Buck Act enables the states to impose certain
taxes, including income taxes, within federal enclaves. An income tax is defined as any tax levied on, with respect to, or measured by, net income, gross
income, or gross receipts." The state did not contend that the regulation pipeline tax was a Buck Act income tax, and therefore, the court considered only
the application of the Buck Act to the occupation tax. The court concluded
that although the tax is called an "occupation tax" by the Texas statutes, 4 it
is measured by gross receipts and therefore falls within the taxing authority
permitted by the Buck Act.
VI. PROCEDURE

Two venue cases decided during the year should be mentioned. Young v.
McGill" reiterates the accepted rule that an oil operator is not required to
fence his well location to prevent injury to the surface owner's cattle. McGill
sued Young in Andrews County for damages for the loss of some cattle that
drank oil from around defendant's well. Young filed a plea of privilege to
be sued in Tarrant County, and McGill filed a controverting affidavit alleging
4 See Harrison v. MacGregor, 112 S.W.2d 1095 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1938);
Wardlaw v. Pace, 66 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1933); W.C. Biggers & Co.
v. First Nat'l Bank, 29 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1930), error dismissed.
48478 S.W.2d 926 (Tex. 1972).
122A, arts. 3.01-.11, 4.01-.14 (1969).
49TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. tit.
50
1d. art. 6032 (1962).
51464 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1971).
524 U.S.C. §§ 105-10 (1970).
53
1d. S 110(c).
5T TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. tit. 122A, arts. 3.01(1), 4.02, 5.01 (1969).
1473 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1971).
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venue in Andrews County under the negligence exception.' The negligence
alleged was failure to fence the site, failure to repair the leak, failure to dispose of the leaking oil, and failure to make inspections. The court of appeals
recognized the established rule that the operator of an oil and gas lease has
no duty to fence around the well site; thus, since there was no duty, the petition raised no issue of negligence. The court further refused to take judicial
notice of Railroad Commission rules which forbid oil on the surface." There
being no evidence in the record of unreasonable use of the surface or use of
more surface than reasonably necessary, the court ruled that the plaintiff had
not discharged his burden of supporting a cause of action in negligence.
The other case involved pooling. 8 The lessor sued the lessee in Matagorda
County, alleging damages for breach of an implied covenant in an oil and
gas lease covering land in Matagorda County. The lessee, two years after
establishment of production on the lease, and after the end of the primary
term, pooled a portion of the lease where a producing well was located with
other lands. This reduced the royalty payable to the plaintiff from one-eighth
to one-forty-eighth. The lessee filed a plea of privilege which was overruled.
It was held that venue existed in Matagorda County under the exceptions for
a contract in writing to be performed in a particular county5 and fraud committed in the county where the suit is brought. "
The lease provided for pooling for gas of up to 320 acres in order to comply
with spacing rules, "or when, in lessee's judgment, it was necessary or advisable to do so in order to properly develop and operate the leased premises."'"
Relying upon the implied covenant to do what a reasonably prudent operator
would do under the same or similar circumstances as being a part of the
written contract (i.e., the lease), the court upheld venue under the written
contract exception without the requirement of proof of the existence of a
cause of action. The court further held that venue existed because of the fraud
exception, assuming, in the absence of a statement of facts, that the plaintiff
had a cause of action for breach of the lessee's fiduciary duty to exercise the
utmost good faith when exercising the power granted under the pooling
provision.

56

TEx. REV. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 1995, § 9a (1964).
5"See Rules 7, 8, 20, Tex. R.R. Comm'n Rules & Regs. § 1, at 6, 15.
SMcCarter v. Ransom, 473 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1971).
59
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN, art.

I/d.
§ 7.
e'473 S.W.2d at 237.

1995, subd. 5 (1964).

